497 lines
22 KiB
Groff
497 lines
22 KiB
Groff
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.\" ========================================================================
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.\"
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.IX Title "X509_VERIFY_PARAM_SET_FLAGS 3"
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.TH X509_VERIFY_PARAM_SET_FLAGS 3 "2018-11-20" "1.1.1a" "OpenSSL"
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.\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
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.\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
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.if n .ad l
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.nh
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.SH "NAME"
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc \&\- X509 verification parameters
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
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.Vb 1
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\& #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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\&
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& unsigned long flags);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& unsigned long flags);
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\& unsigned long X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\&
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& uint32_t flags);
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\& uint32_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\&
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int purpose);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int trust);
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\&
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\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, time_t t);
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\& time_t X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\&
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& ASN1_OBJECT *policy);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policies);
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\&
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\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, int depth);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\&
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\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& int auth_level);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\&
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& const char *name, size_t namelen);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& const char *name, size_t namelen);
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\& void X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& unsigned int flags);
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\& unsigned int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\& char *X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& const char *email, size_t emaillen);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param,
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\& const unsigned char *ip, size_t iplen);
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\& int X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc);
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.Ve
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.SH "DESCRIPTION"
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.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
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These functions manipulate the \fBX509_VERIFY_PARAM\fR structure associated with
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a certificate verification operation.
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.PP
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The \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags()\fR function sets the flags in \fBparam\fR by oring
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it with \fBflags\fR. See the \fB\s-1VERIFICATION FLAGS\s0\fR section for a complete
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description of values the \fBflags\fR parameter can take.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags()\fR returns the flags in \fBparam\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags()\fR returns the inheritance flags in \fBparam\fR
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which specifies how verification flags are copied from one structure to
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another. \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags()\fR sets the inheritance flags.
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See the \fB\s-1INHERITANCE FLAGS\s0\fR section for a description of these bits.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags()\fR clears the flags \fBflags\fR in \fBparam\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose()\fR sets the verification purpose in \fBparam\fR
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to \fBpurpose\fR. This determines the acceptable purpose of the certificate
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chain, for example \s-1SSL\s0 client or \s-1SSL\s0 server.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust()\fR sets the trust setting in \fBparam\fR to
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\&\fBtrust\fR.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()\fR sets the verification time in \fBparam\fR to
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\&\fBt\fR. Normally the current time is used.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()\fR enables policy checking (it is disabled
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by default) and adds \fBpolicy\fR to the acceptable policy set.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()\fR enables policy checking (it is disabled
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by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to \fBpolicies\fR. Any existing
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policy set is cleared. The \fBpolicies\fR parameter can be \fB\s-1NULL\s0\fR to clear
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an existing policy set.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth()\fR sets the maximum verification depth to \fBdepth\fR.
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That is the maximum number of intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificates that can appear in a
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chain.
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A maximal depth chain contains 2 more certificates than the limit, since
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neither the end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor count against this
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limit.
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Thus a \fBdepth\fR limit of 0 only allows the end-entity certificate to be signed
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directly by the trust-anchor, while with a \fBdepth\fR limit of 1 there can be one
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intermediate \s-1CA\s0 certificate between the trust-anchor and the end-entity
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certificate.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level()\fR sets the authentication security level to
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\&\fBauth_level\fR.
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The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and public
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key strength when verifying certificate chains.
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For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
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must meet the specified security level.
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The signature algorithm security level is not enforced for the chain's \fItrust
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anchor\fR certificate, which is either directly trusted or validated by means other
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than its signature.
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See \fISSL_CTX_set_security_level\fR\|(3) for the definitions of the available
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levels.
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The default security level is \-1, or \*(L"not set\*(R".
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At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
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Security level 1 requires at least 80\-bit\-equivalent security and is broadly
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interoperable, though it will, for example, reject \s-1MD5\s0 signatures or \s-1RSA\s0 keys
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shorter than 1024 bits.
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.PP
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR sets the expected \s-1DNS\s0 hostname to
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\&\fBname\fR clearing any previously specified host name or names. If
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\&\fBname\fR is \s-1NULL,\s0 or empty the list of hostnames is cleared, and
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name checks are not performed on the peer certificate. If \fBname\fR
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is NUL-terminated, \fBnamelen\fR may be zero, otherwise \fBnamelen\fR
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must be set to the length of \fBname\fR.
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.PP
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When a hostname is specified,
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certificate verification automatically invokes \fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3)
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with flags equal to the \fBflags\fR argument given to
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\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()\fR (default zero). Applications
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are strongly advised to use this interface in preference to explicitly
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calling \fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3), hostname checks may be out of scope
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with the \s-1\fIDANE\-EE\s0\fR\|(3) certificate usage, and the internal check will
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be suppressed as appropriate when \s-1DANE\s0 verification is enabled.
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.PP
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When the subject CommonName will not be ignored, whether as a result of the
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\&\fBX509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT\fR host flag, or because no \s-1DNS\s0 subject
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alternative names are present in the certificate, any \s-1DNS\s0 name constraints in
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issuer certificates apply to the subject CommonName as well as the subject
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alternative name extension.
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.PP
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When the subject CommonName will be ignored, whether as a result of the
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\&\fBX509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT\fR host flag, or because some \s-1DNS\s0 subject
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alternative names are present in the certificate, \s-1DNS\s0 name constraints in
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issuer certificates will not be applied to the subject \s-1DN.\s0
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As described in \fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3) the \fBX509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT\fR
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flag takes precedence over the \fBX509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT\fR flag.
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.PP
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|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags()\fR returns any host flags previously set via a
|
||
|
|
call to \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags()\fR.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()\fR adds \fBname\fR as an additional reference
|
||
|
|
identifier that can match the peer's certificate. Any previous names
|
||
|
|
set via \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR or \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()\fR
|
||
|
|
are retained, no change is made if \fBname\fR is \s-1NULL\s0 or empty. When
|
||
|
|
multiple names are configured, the peer is considered verified when
|
||
|
|
any name matches.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername()\fR returns the \s-1DNS\s0 hostname or subject
|
||
|
|
CommonName from the peer certificate that matched one of the reference
|
||
|
|
identifiers. When wildcard matching is not disabled, or when a
|
||
|
|
reference identifier specifies a parent domain (starts with \*(L".\*(R")
|
||
|
|
rather than a hostname, the peer name may be a wildcard name or a
|
||
|
|
sub-domain of the reference identifier respectively. The return
|
||
|
|
string is allocated by the library and is no longer valid once the
|
||
|
|
associated \fBparam\fR argument is freed. Applications must not free
|
||
|
|
the return value.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email()\fR sets the expected \s-1RFC822\s0 email address to
|
||
|
|
\&\fBemail\fR. If \fBemail\fR is NUL-terminated, \fBemaillen\fR may be zero, otherwise
|
||
|
|
\&\fBemaillen\fR must be set to the length of \fBemail\fR. When an email address
|
||
|
|
is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_check_email\fR\|(3).
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip()\fR sets the expected \s-1IP\s0 address to \fBip\fR.
|
||
|
|
The \fBip\fR argument is in binary format, in network byte-order and
|
||
|
|
\&\fBiplen\fR must be set to 4 for IPv4 and 16 for IPv6. When an \s-1IP\s0
|
||
|
|
address is specified, certificate verification automatically invokes
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_check_ip\fR\|(3).
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc()\fR sets the expected \s-1IP\s0 address to
|
||
|
|
\&\fBipasc\fR. The \fBipasc\fR argument is a NUL-terminal \s-1ASCII\s0 string:
|
||
|
|
dotted decimal quad for IPv4 and colon-separated hexadecimal for
|
||
|
|
IPv6. The condensed \*(L"::\*(R" notation is supported for IPv6 addresses.
|
||
|
|
.SH "RETURN VALUES"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags()\fR,
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_inh_flags()\fR,
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust()\fR,
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()\fR \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies()\fR,
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host()\fR,
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email()\fR, \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip()\fR and
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc()\fR return 1 for success and 0 for
|
||
|
|
failure.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags()\fR returns the current verification flags.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags()\fR returns any current host flags.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_inh_flags()\fR returns the current inheritance flags.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()\fR and \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth()\fR do not return
|
||
|
|
values.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth()\fR returns the current verification depth.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_auth_level()\fR returns the current authentication security
|
||
|
|
level.
|
||
|
|
.SH "VERIFICATION FLAGS"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "VERIFICATION FLAGS"
|
||
|
|
The verification flags consists of zero or more of the following flags
|
||
|
|
ored together.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK\fR enables \s-1CRL\s0 checking for the certificate chain leaf
|
||
|
|
certificate. An error occurs if a suitable \s-1CRL\s0 cannot be found.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL\fR enables \s-1CRL\s0 checking for the entire certificate
|
||
|
|
chain.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL\fR disabled critical extension checking. By default
|
||
|
|
any unhandled critical extensions in certificates or (if checked) CRLs results
|
||
|
|
in a fatal error. If this flag is set unhandled critical extensions are
|
||
|
|
ignored. \fB\s-1WARNING\s0\fR setting this option for anything other than debugging
|
||
|
|
purposes can be a security risk. Finer control over which extensions are
|
||
|
|
supported can be performed in the verification callback.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
The \fBX509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT\fR flag disables workarounds for some broken
|
||
|
|
certificates and makes the verification strictly apply \fBX509\fR rules.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS\fR enables proxy certificate verification.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK\fR enables certificate policy checking, by default
|
||
|
|
no policy checking is performed. Additional information is sent to the
|
||
|
|
verification callback relating to policy checking.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY\fR, \fBX509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY\fR and
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP\fR set the \fBrequire explicit policy\fR, \fBinhibit any
|
||
|
|
policy\fR and \fBinhibit policy mapping\fR flags respectively as defined in
|
||
|
|
\&\fB\s-1RFC3280\s0\fR. Policy checking is automatically enabled if any of these flags
|
||
|
|
are set.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY\fR is set and the policy checking is successful
|
||
|
|
a special status code is set to the verification callback. This permits it
|
||
|
|
to examine the valid policy tree and perform additional checks or simply
|
||
|
|
log it for debugging purposes.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
By default some additional features such as indirect CRLs and CRLs signed by
|
||
|
|
different keys are disabled. If \fBX509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT\fR is set
|
||
|
|
they are enabled.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS\fR is set delta CRLs (if present) are used to
|
||
|
|
determine certificate status. If not set deltas are ignored.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fBX509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE\fR enables checking of the root \s-1CA\s0 self signed
|
||
|
|
certificate signature. By default this check is disabled because it doesn't
|
||
|
|
add any additional security but in some cases applications might want to
|
||
|
|
check the signature anyway. A side effect of not checking the root \s-1CA\s0
|
||
|
|
signature is that disabled or unsupported message digests on the root \s-1CA\s0
|
||
|
|
are not treated as fatal errors.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
When \fBX509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST\fR is set, construction of the certificate chain
|
||
|
|
in \fIX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3) will search the trust store for issuer certificates
|
||
|
|
before searching the provided untrusted certificates.
|
||
|
|
Local issuer certificates are often more likely to satisfy local security
|
||
|
|
requirements and lead to a locally trusted root.
|
||
|
|
This is especially important when some certificates in the trust store have
|
||
|
|
explicit trust settings (see \*(L"\s-1TRUST SETTINGS\*(R"\s0 in \fIx509\fR\|(1)).
|
||
|
|
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
The \fBX509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS\fR flag suppresses checking for alternative
|
||
|
|
chains.
|
||
|
|
By default, unless \fBX509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST\fR is set, when building a
|
||
|
|
certificate chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then
|
||
|
|
OpenSSL will attempt to replace untrusted certificates supplied by the peer
|
||
|
|
with certificates from the trust store to see if an alternative chain can be
|
||
|
|
found that is trusted.
|
||
|
|
As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, with \fBX509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST\fR always set, this option
|
||
|
|
has no effect.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
The \fBX509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN\fR flag causes intermediate certificates in the
|
||
|
|
trust store to be treated as trust-anchors, in the same way as the self-signed
|
||
|
|
root \s-1CA\s0 certificates.
|
||
|
|
This makes it possible to trust certificates issued by an intermediate \s-1CA\s0
|
||
|
|
without having to trust its ancestor root \s-1CA.\s0
|
||
|
|
With OpenSSL 1.1.0 and later and <X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN> set, chain
|
||
|
|
construction stops as soon as the first certificate from the trust store is
|
||
|
|
added to the chain, whether that certificate is a self-signed \*(L"root\*(R"
|
||
|
|
certificate or a not self-signed intermediate certificate.
|
||
|
|
Thus, when an intermediate certificate is found in the trust store, the
|
||
|
|
verified chain passed to callbacks may be shorter than it otherwise would
|
||
|
|
be without the \fBX509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN\fR flag.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
The \fBX509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME\fR flag suppresses checking the validity period
|
||
|
|
of certificates and CRLs against the current time. If \fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time()\fR
|
||
|
|
is used to specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
|
||
|
|
.SH "INHERITANCE FLAGS"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "INHERITANCE FLAGS"
|
||
|
|
These flags specify how parameters are \*(L"inherited\*(R" from one structure to
|
||
|
|
another.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_VP_FLAG_ONCE\fR is set then the current setting is zeroed
|
||
|
|
after the next call.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_VP_FLAG_LOCKED\fR is set then no values are copied. This overrides
|
||
|
|
all of the following flags.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT\fR is set then anything set in the source is copied
|
||
|
|
to the destination. Effectively the values in \*(L"to\*(R" become default values
|
||
|
|
which will be used only if nothing new is set in \*(L"from\*(R". This is the
|
||
|
|
default.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE\fR is set then all value are copied across whether
|
||
|
|
they are set or not. Flags is still Ored though.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If \fBX509_VP_FLAG_RESET_FLAGS\fR is set then the flags value is copied instead
|
||
|
|
of ORed.
|
||
|
|
.SH "NOTES"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "NOTES"
|
||
|
|
The above functions should be used to manipulate verification parameters
|
||
|
|
instead of functions which work in specific structures such as
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_STORE_CTX_set_flags()\fR which are likely to be deprecated in a future
|
||
|
|
release.
|
||
|
|
.SH "BUGS"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "BUGS"
|
||
|
|
Delta \s-1CRL\s0 checking is currently primitive. Only a single delta can be used and
|
||
|
|
(partly due to limitations of \fBX509_STORE\fR) constructed CRLs are not
|
||
|
|
maintained.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
If CRLs checking is enable CRLs are expected to be available in the
|
||
|
|
corresponding \fBX509_STORE\fR structure. No attempt is made to download
|
||
|
|
CRLs from the \s-1CRL\s0 distribution points extension.
|
||
|
|
.SH "EXAMPLE"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "EXAMPLE"
|
||
|
|
Enable \s-1CRL\s0 checking when performing certificate verification during \s-1SSL\s0
|
||
|
|
connections associated with an \fB\s-1SSL_CTX\s0\fR structure \fBctx\fR:
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
.Vb 1
|
||
|
|
\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
||
|
|
\&
|
||
|
|
\& param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
||
|
|
\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
|
||
|
|
\& SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, param);
|
||
|
|
\& X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
|
||
|
|
.Ve
|
||
|
|
.SH "SEE ALSO"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_verify_cert\fR\|(3),
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_check_host\fR\|(3),
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_check_email\fR\|(3),
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_check_ip\fR\|(3),
|
||
|
|
\&\fIx509\fR\|(1)
|
||
|
|
.SH "HISTORY"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "HISTORY"
|
||
|
|
The \fBX509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS\fR flag was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0
|
||
|
|
The flag \fBX509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK\fR was deprecated in
|
||
|
|
OpenSSL 1.1.0, and has no effect.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
\&\fIX509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags()\fR was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
|
||
|
|
.SH "COPYRIGHT"
|
||
|
|
.IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
|
||
|
|
Copyright 2009\-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||
|
|
.PP
|
||
|
|
Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the \*(L"License\*(R"). You may not use
|
||
|
|
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||
|
|
in the file \s-1LICENSE\s0 in the source distribution or at
|
||
|
|
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|